Putin’s Public Discourse and Russia’s Reversion to Imperialism in the Post-Soviet Era (2025)

The dissolution of the USSR provided the conditions for Russia to shed its historical imperial identity and define itself as something new. Yet, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 highlights the culmination of Russia’s reversion to imperialism in the post-Soviet era under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Through an analysis of Putin’s speeches and public discourse since coming to power in 1999, this essay will construct the narrative of post-Soviet Russia’s reversion to imperialism that was propelled by the effects of dissolution. This reversion would consolidate, galvanised by Ukrainian efforts for independence and their attempts at disassociation from Russian spheres of influence. This relationship between Russia and Ukraine in the post-Soviet era, is representative of what Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel define as the “escalatory cycle between Russian imperialism and Ukraine’s commitment to its independent statehood that started in the wake of the USSR’s dissolution.” As such, this imperial narrative begins in wake of the USSR’s dissolution, a totalising and challenging experience for a nation whose historical identity had been crucially informed by its territorial boundaries. The difficulties of identity formations in the shadow of dissolution saw the reprisal of the nation’s great power self-perception, a concept analogous with the Russian imperial mindset. The outcomes of Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan revolution inherently challenged Russia’s new imperial identity as Ukraine sought to reorientate itself with the West and free itself from Russian hegemony. Putin’s imperial narrative plays deeply into a historical paranoia of the West that was exacerbated by the events of Maidan. The outcomes of Maidan instigated a process of Putin to essentially re-imperialise Ukrainian identity, arguing that Ukraine was both indistinguishable and indivisible from Russia itself. This denial is representative of Putin’s broader project of the “Russian World”, a deeply imperial concept that sought to extend Russian influence across its modern borders.

The dissolution of the USSR was deeply challenging for Russia as nation whose identity had be historically associated with territorial empire. Putin is often miscited stating the breakup of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” Whilst this quote has been subject to mistranslation with the contestation over whether Putin meant “the greatest” or just “a major” catastrophe, the extent to which the dissolution fundamentally disrupted a vast history of empire for Russia was still immense for Putin, and all of Russia. This immensity would be echoed in his statement that preluded the invasion in 2022 stating that “the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a redivision of the world.” This redivision saw Russia’s role in the international order weaken, losing roughly half of its population, as well as its European territorial peripheries -- faltering down to its sixteenth century size. This was made even more challenging by Belarus and Ukraine declaring independence in 1991, nations who had long been considered within a fraternal affiliation to Russia. This situation as Dmitri Trenin notes “ended any illusions of a “more perfect union” to succeed the USSR.” For a nation whose history can largely understood through successive empires, the dissolution which disrupted this was deeply confusing for Russia as their identity had been enmeshed with expansive territory. As Shevel and Popova further note, “The vision of the entire USSR as a “true” Russian state has a long history, and the collapse of the USSR became not only a political but also a psychological shock to those in Russia who had internalized such supranational identity.” The totalising realities of the loss of territory that resulted from dissolution proved extremely challenging to comprehend for a people whose identity had been historically defined by empire.

The challenges posed by dissolution to Russian identity saw the quick reversion back to great power self-perceptions in the absence of any strong identity foundations. The debates over the substance of the new Russian identity after dissolution was a highly publicised discourse, mainly between Yeltsin and the liberal reformers with the nationalists and neo-communists in opposition. After several years the “concepts of gosudarstvennost' (strong stateness) and derzhavnost' (Great Power-ness), which had been central to imperial understandings of statehood, reemerged but they did so in a radically altered, postimperial context.” The return of these concepts was linked to a nostalgic romanticism by the political elite and guided by a reluctance to accept the realities of Russia’s power loss following dissolution. Putin would continue this conception instantly as he came into power following Boris Yelstin’s resignation in 1999. In his first address as acting president, Putin stated, “Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic, and cultural existence.” Putin establishes continuities between the new Russian federation with its Soviet and Imperial histories, reverting to a self-perception of great power status that had been Russia’s political reality for centuries. This reversion was abetted by the reality that, as Stanislaw Bielen notes “after the collapse of the USSR, Russia became virtually a synonym of its previous imperial incarnation, even though it lost many of the attributes of its past power.” With the relation between imperial geographic domain and Russia’s self-perception as a great power , Putin pragmatically attempted to restore Russia’s great power status through an influence over the post-Soviet space, or as Putin characterises it in his political vocabulary, the “Near Abroad.” The return of Russia’s great power self-perception was due to the absence of an alternate identity of the new Russian statehood which informed Putin’s reversion back imperialist control over the post-Soviet space, to ultimately make their self-perception a reality.

Russia’s reversion back to its imperialist identity, enacted in its spheres of orbit, was fundamentally challenged by Ukraine’s Euromaidan in 2014. The mass civil demonstrations in Ukraine from 2013-2014, that deposed Russian-backed Viktor Yanukovych marked a new trajectory for the nation. The movement installed a democratic government, and instigated Ukraine’s Western integration to distance itself from Russian influence. Putin’s response to this was immediately to delegitimise it, characterising it as a “coup” , principally as it comprised their imperial influences in the nation. Putin’s response to Maidan by annexing Crimea and invading the Donbas in 2014 worked to destabilise Ukraine’s new government and reestablish Russian hegemony in parts of the country. Both Putin’s rhetoric and actions are representative of the salience of Ukraine in the Russian imperial imagination, evidence of Russia’s perception that “without Ukraine, no Russian empire was possible.” The Maidan inherently comprised Russia’s new forms of empire in the post-Soviet period, deepened by the fact that Russia had historically conceived Ukraine as an extension of itself. Putin’s reactionary response highlights what Shevel and Popova note that “the civilizational imaginary of Russia is imperial and thus fundamentally incompatible with the conception of Ukraine as a distinct nation pursuing policies of it choosing in an independent Ukrainian state.” Whilst the Maidan made the divergence between Russia and Ukraine permanent, it inherently triggered Putin in the ways it challenged Russian imperial imaginations and identities through their loss of influence in the nation.

Russian conceptions of the West play deeply into Putin’s imperialist reversions. Putin’s paranoia over the West is a belief which predates the revolutions. In 2007 at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy Putin stated “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: Against whom is this expansion intended.” These anxieties over the West, understood by Putin within securitisation lexicon, were exacerbated by Maidan in 2014 that proliferated the possibilities of Ukrainian membership in the EU and NATO. He attributes the outcomes of Maidan as Western powers “us[ing] regional conflicts, and design[ing] ‘colour revolutions’ to suit their interests” at the expense of Russia. Putin’s rhetoric is indicative of a much broader, more historical paranoia over the West. In discussing Russia’s rationale for Ukrainian invasion, Setfanie Ortmann notes Russia’s “process of re-territorialization operates across different identity registers in which the territory of Ukraine has become intertwined with a broader geopolitical imaginary of ‘the West’. The Russian idea of spatial ambiguity predates the Soviet experience and has always had ambivalent connotations; celebrated by some as expression of imperial greatness, it also conveys anxiety around Russia’s unruly, uncontrollable vastness.” For Russia, the possibility of Ukraine seeking Western association is inherently viewed as anti-Russian considering how historically entangled the two nations were. Putin’s paranoia over the West in relation to Maidan is consistent with a deeper, historical phenomenon, yet Putin’s use of this as rationale for Ukrainian invasion represents his imperialist incentives.

The outcome of Euromaidan instigated Putin to re-imperialise Ukrainian identity. Aside from the installation of a new government, Maidan was monumental in the establishment of a distinct Ukrainian national identity. Considering how this outcome rebuffed Russian imperial claims, Putin’s reaction was to essentially deny Ukrainian existence. In 2021, a year prior to the invasion, Putin published a 7000-word quasi-scholarly essay titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” In the article he cites that “Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus.” According to Putin, over centuries of being under different rule it culminated in “fragmentation” – which caused the “emergence of dialects.” He further argues that Ukrainian nationalist understandings that formulated in response to the banning of the Ukrainian language in the 1800s were the result of the Polish elite to exploit the “Ukrainian issue” for their own pollical purposes. Putin’s historical account culminates in stating that “modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era.” This historical article defines Ukraine within “An ‘almost mystical attachment to the territory “from where [Kievan] Rus’ had originated” is part of this, grounding not only the origins of Russian Orthodoxy but also claims to a 1000-year continuity of Russian statehood which was later translated into a spatially ambivalent understanding of ‘Russia’ as encompassing the whole of the USSR.” In Putin’s denial of a distinct Ukrainian identity, he attempts to weaken the identity formations that resulted from Maidan. Through arguing that Ukraine is both indistinguishable and indivisible from Russia, Putin legitimises his imperialist mission and satiates the Russian imperial identity.

This re-imperialisation falls into Putin’s broader conception that took hold in the post-Soviet space of the “Russian world.” In 2001 Putin declared “since time immemorial the concept of the ‘Russian Word’ extended far beyond the geographical borders of Russia and even beyond those of the Russian ethnos.” The meaning of the concept has changed freely in the post-Soviet era, beginning as an alternative to nationalism and imperialism, it is now almost synonymous with the two. Despite its ambiguity, much of the concept is premised on the cultural and political unity of Russians, both within and outside the borders of the Russian Federation. The boundaries of the “Russian World” are firmly linked with the former Soviet Union. Putin continued to strengthen the concept of the Russian World throughout his leadership. In an address to the federal assembly in 2007, Putin spoke of the “multimillion Russian [russkii] world which is, of course, much larger than Russia.” The concept became formalised in 2007 by the United Russia party and was used both as policy guidance and a rationale for Russian influence in post-Soviet states. Though as Shevel and Popova note, “The Russian World project was not just an expression of nostalgia for the shared past. It questioned both the legitimacy and desirability of post-Soviet political realities.” This fact makes it deeply imperial project. Putin would use the Russian World Project to legitimise his overt imperial aim, namely in the aftermath of his annexation of Crimea as the “aspiration of the Russian World… to reestablish unity.” Through the Russian World project, as Igor Zevelev states, “the ideology of post-Soviet revanchism has now become practically official, including the image of Russia as the gatherer of a ‘Russian World’ divided by artificial borders.” The “Russian World” both in concept and in practice is representative of Russia’s imperial imaginations. The Russian World concept is indicative of Putin’s broader imperial worldview, that in their reversion to imperialism, is used to ideologically bind together Russia’s historical empire in the post-Soviet era.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is the culmination of their reversion back to imperialism in the post-Soviet era. The dissolution of the USSR was totalising for Russia whose identity had historically enmeshed with empire. What resulted was a quick return of great power self-perceptions, even if this contradicted reality. Though, Ukraine’s Euromaidan in 2014 fundamentally challenged Russia’s imperialist reversions. Putin’s paranoia over the West in this imperial narrative is reflective of a historical Russian phenomenon, yet his use of this as his rationale in Ukraine highlights his imperialist motivations. The outcomes of Maidan galvanised Putin to re-imperialise Ukrainian identity, essentially denying its existence. This denial supplemented his broader imperial project of the reunification of the “Russian World.” Through Putin’s public discourse, his imperialist narrative positions Ukraine “as the Russian territory of desire, a historical core of its symbolic aspirations —and possibly, the axis of Russia’s integrity as a state.” Whilst the extent of Putin’s attempts to restore Russian empire in its totality remains to be seen, his imperial ambitions remain latent in his public discourse.

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